Saving Lives on the Battlefield (Part II) – One Year Later

A Joint Theater Trauma System & Joint Trauma System Review of Pre-Hospital Trauma Care in Combined Joint Operating Area – Afghanistan (CJOA-A)

FINAL REPORT
30 May 2014

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The U.S. has achieved unprecedented survival rates, as high as 98%, for casualties arriving alive to the combat hospital. Our military medical personnel are rightly proud of this achievement. Commanders and service members are confident that if wounded and moved to a Role II or III medical facility, their care will be the best in the world. Combat casualty care however, begins at the point of injury and continues through evacuation to those facilities. With up to 25% of deaths on the battlefield being potentially preventable, the pre-hospital environment is the next frontier for making significant further improvements in battlefield trauma care. Strict adherence to the evidence-based Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Guidelines has been proven to reduce morbidity and mortality on the battlefield. However, full implementation across the entire force and commitment from both line and medical leadership continue to face ongoing challenges.

This report on pre-hospital trauma in the Combined Joint Operations Area – Afghanistan (CJOA-A) is a follow-on to the one previously conducted in November 2012 and published in January 2013. Both assessments were conducted by the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Joint Theater Trauma System (JTTS). Observations for this report were collected from December 2013 to January 2014 and were obtained directly from deployed pre-hospital providers, medical leaders, and combatant leaders. Significant progress has been made between these two reports with the establishment of a Pre-Hospital Care Division within the JTTS; development of a pre-hospital trauma registry and weekly pre-hospital trauma conferences; and CJOA-A theater guidance and enforcement of pre-hospital documentation. Specific pre-hospital trauma care achievements include expansion of transfusion capabilities forward to the point of injury, junctional tourniquets, and universal approval of tranexamic acid.
Observations & Discussion

TCCC Guidelines are widely, though not universally, accepted as Authoritative “best practices” for pre-hospital trauma care; however, they are not Directive policy. The high degree of variance amongst deployed unit medical personnel, both in terms of clinical training and operational experience, results in inconsistent application and enforcement of TCCC compliance across the force. Since our line commanders are dependent upon their unit medical personnel to inform their understanding, appreciation, and prioritization of medical support requirements, their TCCC commitment and command emphasis understandably varies as well.

In the face of near-term resource constraints, without doctrinal and policy endorsement, the Services will continue to struggle to adequately and fully Organize, Train, and Equip to meet TCCC Guidelines as the standard for pre-hospital care. A previous memorandum and recommendation by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to train all combatants and deployed medical personnel in TCCC remains incompletely implemented across the DoD. In contrast, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) have codified TCCC compliance as policy and reduced pre-hospital case fatality rates.

We must continue to embrace and explore emerging capabilities to deliver far-forward resuscitative care. Those capabilities that are both responsive and adaptive to the dynamic tactical landscape hold the greatest intrinsic value for our line commanders and their personnel. We must also ensure that our supporting Organize, Train, and Equip functions have the agility to keep pace with these evolving standards of care.

We must increase the investment in our medical personnel to develop and retain true expertise in pre-hospital trauma care delivery and oversight. These must become core competencies in the unique domain of operational medical support and we must embrace new medical training paradigms that advance these skills. Finally, officer professional development for both line and medical leaders must emphasize the shared responsibilities for developing and enforcing robust unit commitment to lifesaving pre-hospital trauma care principles.

Findings

1. The lack of standardized TCCC capability may represent a causal factor for the increased killed in action, case fatality rate, and preventable deaths seen in conventional forces when compared to special operations forces.

2. Absent a validated joint requirement which is captured doctrinally, the prevailing resource-constrained environment will challenge Services to fully Organize, Train, and Equip to TCCC standards.
3. There is no evidence that the DoD or CJOA-A has policies or procedures in place to validate or enforce pre-hospital care within an organization. Service-specific doctrine requiring Unit Surgeons to each establish a standard of care, allows for variant, non-standard delivery of battlefield trauma care across the force. Furthermore, even within a single command, rotation of Unit Surgeons introduces and magnifies discontinuity of unit trauma care standards.

4. The requirements to perform and support pre-hospital TCCC could be standardized across Services (universally or at the Combatant Command level) with the specific means to achieve these Train & Equip standards left up to the respective Services.

5. As with elements of pre-hospital care, organization structures are highly variant with a number of at-risk forces not having adequately manned/trained/equipped medical support.

6. Units with a tactical evacuation mission requirement should be task organized to be able to provide advanced enroute resuscitative care from the point of injury.

7. Robust training platforms exist for pre-hospital trauma care, though not all course training syllabi keep pace with current best practices. Sufficient information technologies exist to rapidly and widely disperse new TCCC Guidelines as they become immediately available.

8. Unit equipment sets and supporting medical logistics systems have not kept pace with evolving pre-hospital care TCCC guidelines. Outdated items remain within the supply chain and newly required items have not yet been incorporated into standard configurations.

9. In the absence of a widely mandated policy that establishes TCCC Guidelines as the standard for pre-hospital battlefield care, and accountability for deviations from this standard, the degree of penetrance and acceptance of TCCC Guidelines will remain episodic and dependent upon individual (Surgeon and commander) commitment.

10. Neither line nor operational medical leaders are optimally prepared to recognize the importance of a robust, pre-hospital care system, or equipped with the requisite knowledge, skills, or experience to build or sustain such a system within their unit.

**New Recommendations**

1. DoD establishes TCCC Guidelines as the DoD standard of care for pre-hospital care.

2. DoD conducts a DOTMLPF-P assessment across Services to assess and implement TCCC Guideline capability.

3. DoD systematically review and correct all pre-hospital care doctrine across the spectrum to accurately represent TCCC Guidelines with the doctrine specifically stating “in accordance with
the current TCCC Guidelines published by the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care" to ensure that the doctrine remains current.

4. Services immediately implement an aggressive transition initiative to update all relevant medical equipment sets and medical logistic policies to ensure units have TCCC Guideline specified medical materials.

5. DoD establishes a Battlefield Pre-Hospital Trauma Care Program Proponent (or equivalent structure) in the DHA.

6. DoD develop and mandate a TCCC Accreditation, Certification, and Recertification program like Basic Life Support, Advanced Trauma Life Support, and Advanced Cardiac Life Support for all military personnel with a requirement for biannual re-certification and as based on level of ability and position (e.g. Non-Medical First Responder, Non-Medical Leader, Medical Provider, Medical Leader).

7. Services require and track TCCC certification for all pre-hospital medical personnel and integrate tracking into combatant Unit Status Reports.

8. Services incorporate TCCC Champion training into all basic and advanced officer and non-commissioned officer professional military development courses.

9. Services incorporate and mandate casualty management and hands on practical exercises into all professional military development courses.

10. DoD updates the Joint Capability Requirement for Tactical Enroute Care to include the ability to provide advanced resuscitative care from the point of injury.

11. As military physicians are ultimately responsible for assuming the role of EMS Director for pre-hospital services if assigned to a combatant unit, the military Services should study and develop career, educational and assignment tracks for operational medical corps officers which includes emphasis upon pre-hospital care delivery.

**Conclusion**

History teaches that the lessons we have learned regarding combat casualty care may be lost if we fail to attend to them in the coming years. Even in a resource-constrained future, the MHS has the necessary raw materials of personnel, organization, and experience to retain and refine our current best practices. With continued efforts aimed at 1) formalizing TCCC Guideline compliance across the force; 2) embracing evidence-based methods to continually improve upon these Guidelines; and 3) selecting, developing and retaining operational medical personnel dedicated to pre-hospital trauma care, the MHS will ensure an organizational culture that fully embraces pre-hospital combat casualty care as a core competency.
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SECTION 1. PURPOSE

Mission

To conduct a capabilities based assessment of pre-hospital trauma care within the Combined Joint Operations Area–Afghanistan (CJOA-A) and provide recommendations to improve pre-hospital combat casualty care and injury survivability. The largest potential gains for improving survival among U.S. combat casualties remain in the pre-hospital environment.

This report is not a standalone document. Both the methods used to develop this report and the content must be viewed in the context of the USCENTCOM Report by Kotwal et al entitled “Saving Lives on the Battlefield,” dated 30 January 2013. This report is an adjunct and follow-up assessment on the CJOA-A development and implementation of pre-hospital care one year from that document’s initial publication. Our assessment occurred from 15 December 2013 to 20 January 2014. It was also conducted during the Afghanistan Campaign’s retrograde process and concurrent “seasonal slowdown” of enemy activity. Subsequently, the results of this survey will also need to be viewed from that perspective.

Intent

To observe, discuss, record, and evaluate pre-hospital trauma care tactics, techniques, and procedures conducted in the pre-hospital battlefield environment as obtained directly from deployed pre-hospital providers, medical leaders, and combatant leaders among the various US military services one year after the initial assessment.

The overall goal of this re-assessment is to provide recommendations that will reduce preventable combat death among US, Coalition, and Afghan forces to the lowest incidence achievable. Three primary areas of focus include: 1) identify best practices that can be cross-leveled among the force, 2) identify actionable areas of performance improvement that will optimize pre-hospital trauma care timing, delivery, and casualty survivability, and 3) identify potential gaps in pre-hospital trauma care across the DOTMLPF domain.

SECTION 2. METHODOLOGY
The assessment team was comprised of CJOA-A deployed personnel from the Joint Theater Trauma System (JTTS) Pre-Hospital Division. This pre-hospital division was integrated into the JTTS as a result of the initial CJOA-A pre-hospital report recommendations to USCENTCOM. As this team is now an organic theater asset, the assessment was conducted over 45 days, allowing for the inclusion of more geographically isolated ROLE-1s.

Unique to this assessment was the decision to limit the assessment to conventional forces. There were three driving factors in this decision: 1) Conventional forces suffer the most casualties (including Afghanistan security forces); 2) U.S. special operations forces have previously achieved demonstrable success in the area of TCCC; and 3) Thus the team focused on organizations whereby the largest benefits could yet be realized.

The team focused on ROLE-1s and TACEVAC organizations as these organizations are the providers of pre-hospital care. Individual and group interviews were conducted with the spectrum of ROLE-1 health care providers. This included enlisted medical personnel, physicians, physician assistants, nurses, commanders, and Warfighters. In addition to unstructured dialogue, the team used specified questions regarding TCCC Guidelines utilizing the DOTMLPF structure to identify potential capability gaps in pre-hospital care delivery.

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**Support Team, Joint Theater Trauma System (JTTS) and Joint Trauma System (JTS)**

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Robert L. Mabry, MD; LTC, MC, USA; Incoming Director of JTS Trauma Care Delivery
Frank K. Butler, MD; CAPT, MC, USN; Director of JTS Pre-Hospital Trauma Care
Zsolt T. Stockinger, MD; CAPT, MC, USN; Director of JTS Performance Improvement
Jeffrey A. Bailey, MD; Col, MC, USAF; Director of JTS

**CJOA-A Assessment Locations of the ROLE-1s**

Leatherneck  Boldak  Spin Boldak  Lashkar Gah  Kandahar  Pasab  Clark
Shank  Rushmore  Lightning  Eredvi  Sabit Qadam  Ebbert  Walton
Frontenac  Airborne  Tokham  Mehtar Lam  Gamberi  Bagram  Ghazni
Dwyer  Shukvani
Caveats

The term “medic” is used throughout this document and generically refers to enlisted medical personnel of all services providing pre-hospital care. Service specific branding and education level titles are used when they are important to the message. The term medical officer generically refers to physicians and physician assistants. The term “Unit Surgeon” specifically identifies the officer designated as senior medical officer of a deployed line unit. The term “Warfighter” generically refers to all combatants regardless of Service.

Assessment Methods

Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) Questions:

1. What is the standard of care for pre-hospital care in U.S. Department of Defense Combat Operations?

2. Are the TCCC Guidelines the U.S. Department of Defense Combat Operation pre-hospital standard of care?

3. Are the TCCC Guidelines doctrine?

4. What are the policies or regulations used to conduct pre-hospital quality assurance and quality improvement programs during U.S. Department of Defense Combat Operations?

5. Are the TCCC Guidelines currently enforceable as a pre-hospital standard of care?

6. Is delivery of TCCC standardized across combatant organizations?

7. Does our current doctrine support the effective implementation of TCCC guidelines at the tactical and operational levels on the battlefield?

8. Are our tactical and operational organizations structured to support the delivery of pre-hospital care?

9. Does the current training structure support the effective delivery of pre-hospital care using a standard of care that is tactically and operationally available across the spectrum of the battlefield?

10. Do our currently fielded tactical medical sets, kits, and outfits ensure the delivery of effective pre-hospital care using TCCC Guidelines?
11. Are tactical, operational, and strategic Command Surgeons correctly empowered under a DOTMLPF-P integration to ensure the delivery of effective pre-hospital care using a standard of care?

12. Do our current medical logistics techniques comprehensively and effectively supply our forces and ensure adequate medical materials to provide pre-hospital care using TCCC Guidelines?

13. Are our maneuver commanders and medical leaders adequately trained and educated to ensure the effective delivery of pre-hospital care using TCCC Guidelines across the battlefield?

14. Does the human capital management process assign the right leaders and technical experts to the right levels to ensure the effective delivery of pre-hospital care using TCCC Guidelines across the battlefield?

Responses to these questions and unstructured interviews were organized according to the DOTMLPF construct as defined by the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process, in order to identify and address gaps relating to the tactical and operational implementation of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Guidelines.

**DOTMLPF**

- **Doctrine**: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (current best thoughts on the methods by which we deliver pre-hospital battlefield trauma care)

- **Organization**: how we command/control the conduct of medical support operations.

- **Training**: how we prepare our medical forces to conduct specified and implied tasks. (basic training to advanced individual medical training, unit medical training with casualty care and evacuation exercises)

- **Materiel**: All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (TCCC Guideline medical materials)

- **Leadership and Education**: how we prepare personnel to organize and lead medical support operations.

- **Personnel**: Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission. (availability of qualified (technically and tactically/ operationally proficient) personnel in the delivery of pre-hospital battlefield trauma care)
- **Facilities**: Real property entities consisting of one or more of the following: building, structure, utility system, pavement, or underlying land. (medical training facilities for pre-hospital battlefield trauma care)

**SECTION 3: OBSERVATIONS, DISCUSSION, & FINDINGS**

**Notable Successes - One Year Later**

It is appropriate to begin any discussion of current Findings & Observations with full acknowledgement of the many successes over the past year between Parts I and II of this report, and the efforts of all who have so diligently dedicated their time and energy to achieve so much over such a short period.

1. A preventable death review and analysis of combat related fatalities is now conducted by a joint team from both the Armed Forces Medical Examiner and the Joint Trauma System. This effort is providing excellent feedback to the theater trauma surgeons at the ROLE 2 and ROLE 3 levels. This effort is also instrumental for identifying issues with pre-hospital care that would otherwise be missed due to the classification of a casualty as a KIA. As this collaborative effort matures, this information will be further disseminated to pre-hospital providers and into the training organizations.

2. Implementation of a pre-hospital Combat Medic Trauma Conference that is for medics, by medics, and hosted by the JTTS in CJOA-A. This effort improves direct peer to peer communication about TCCC Guidelines, best practices and practical solutions.

3. The JTS/JTTS implementation and deployment (via USFOR-A FRAGO) of the Pre-Hospital Trauma Registry along with implementation of the CJOA-A TCCC Casualty Card and TCCC-After Action Report (AAR) system to advance pre-hospital documentation and performance improvement.

4. The designation of the Joint Trauma System (JTS) as a DoD Center of Excellence and as the Lead Agency for Trauma Care and Trauma Systems.

5. The realignment of CoTCCC under the JTS to strengthen its role in providing best-practice pre-hospital trauma care recommendations.

6. Implementation of the initiative to train and sustain all tactical evacuation medics as Critical Care Flight Paramedics.

7. The initial implementation of blood product administration onboard tactical evacuation platforms within CJOA-A, and now elsewhere within the CENTCOM AOR.
8. The deployment and distribution of junctional tourniquets to control non-compressible hemorrhage in the pre-hospital environment.

9. The expanded authorization of tranexamic acid (TXA) to include all deployed pre-hospital forces to control non-compressible hemorrhage in the pre-hospital environment.

10. The authorization of ketamine as a pre-hospital pain management therapy IAW TCCC Guidelines with clear Guideline indications to use low-dose ketamine as the battlefield analgesic of choice for casualties in severe pain/shock/respiratory distress, or at significant risk of these conditions.

11. Creation and manning of the deployed JTTS Pre-Hospital Division (Physician, Physician Assistant, and Senior Medic) with a JTTS Pre-Hospital Care Director in CJOA-A filled by a hand-selected physician with knowledge and experience in POI pre-hospital combat trauma care.

The significant and critical successes over the past twelve years attributed to the Joint Theater Trauma System and the DoD Joint Trauma System are a direct result of their ability to capture data and information from point of injury onward to reduce morbidity and mortality through performance improvement initiatives and refinement of clinical practice guidelines. The pre-hospital elements of this data-capture capability have only been more recently achieved.

### Descriptive Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCCC ASSESSMENT QUESTION</th>
<th>&quot;YES&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;NO&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;SOMEWHAIT&quot;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCCC Command Climate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does your unit commander understand the existence of TCCC Guidelines?</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is TCCC incorporated into training, operations orders, rock drills, and mission execution?</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is your unit’s TCCC capability included in commander’s update reporting/unit status report?</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR-A FRAGO Compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has your unit implemented USFOR-A FRAGO 13-139 (TCCC AAR/TCCC Card)?</td>
<td>77%¹</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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¹ JTTS Data demonstrated 9-21% TCCC AARs and 8% TCCC Card compliance from August 2013 to January 2014.
<table>
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<th>Question</th>
<th>65%</th>
<th>27%</th>
<th>8% (unsure)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Has your unit implemented USFOR-A FRAGO 13-217 (Junctional Tourniquets)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Has your unit implemented USFOR-A FRAGO 13-079 (Assessment Blast Exposure, Concussions)?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TCCC/Combat Trauma Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has your Medical Corps Officer completed C4?</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4% (unsure)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have your licensed pre-hospital providers (Physician/Physician Assistants/Nurses) completed TCMC or other service endorsed similar course?</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>What percentage of your medics have completed BCT3 or other service endorsed similar course?</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have non-medical servicemen completed combat lifesaver training or other service endorsed similar training?</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there TCCC guideline skills you will not train medics?</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are there any TCCC guideline skills you trained medics that supersede their standard training?</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Do you participate in the Weekly Theater JTTS Trauma DCO Conference?</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
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<td>Are you aware of the ISR website that has the latest TCCC guidelines and best practice guidelines CPGs?</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TCCC Medical Logistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Does your unit have adequate medical supplies required to perform all skills within TCCC guidelines?</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have adequate IFAKs/CLS/WALK AID BAGS in order to conduct your mission?</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you receiving medical equipment as requested?</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have junctional tourniquets on hand?</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Selected Observation: A Battalion Surgeon would not allow medics to give IV medications (narcotics and antibiotics) because he considered it too dangerous in his personal “bad experience with Pitocin in internship.” At another location, a unit company grade commander would not allow medics to carry morphine outside the COP because “they are close enough to the aid station.”

3 At the time of the assessment, there were 456 SAM JTs and 500 JETT junctional tourniquets obtained by JTTS and distributed in Theater. Because they hadn’t been pushed forward from the some RC-Surgeon’s offices to the ROLE-1s, many ROLE-1’s didn’t have junctional tourniquets. Or, in one RC, they had been pushed forward and then recalled for re-distribution when the USFOR-A
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<td>DMLS</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECAM</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excel/Email</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<th>What brand of chest seals are you using?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyfin unvented</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halo unvented</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;H unvented</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolin vented</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<th>Tranexamic Acid Capability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you have TXA at BAS?</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have TXA in medics’ aid bags?</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<th>TCCC Pain Management</th>
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<tr>
<td>Are you using TCCC guidelines pain medications?¹</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fentanyl</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketamine</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wound (Combat) Pill Pack</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<table>
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<th>What pain medication do your medics carry?</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morphine</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fentanyl</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketamine</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹ JT FRAGO was published. CRoC’s were ordered and fielded by some units (4%). Waste was also an issue. We found verifiably JTTs procured, distributed and new in wrapper junctional tourniquets pending destruction at the Bagram AF REPAT burn pit less than 45 days after distribution.

² This question assessed if medications were available at the ROLE-1 versus routinely issued and available to medics on patrol.

³ There are no published evidence based studies regarding morphine intramuscular injection for trauma patients. Morphine is NOT a recommended battlefield analgesic in the TCCC Guidelines.
TCCC Antibiotics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you using TCCC guidelines for systemic antibiotics?</th>
<th>35%</th>
<th>15%</th>
<th>50%*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moxifloxin</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cefotetan</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ertapenem</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type of Cricothyrotomy Kit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H&amp;H</th>
<th>58%</th>
<th>42%</th>
<th>0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical CricKit by North American Rescue</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-standard (homemade)</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pelvic Binders

| Do you use pelvic binders for LE blast injuries?       | 62% | 23% | 15%  |

*During the assessment period, only a single ROLE-1 demonstrated full implementation of TCCC Guidelines. This was amongst all of the 23 geographic locations and 26 ROLE-1s within the Regional Commands visited.

DOTMLPF Analysis

Similar to safety mishap investigations, rarely is a single event or circumstance in the mishap chain causative in and of itself. In contrast, from a systems perspective, any one of a number of those factors, if interrupted could disrupt the entire mishap chain and prevent a negative outcome. Pre-hospital battlefield trauma is equally complex and multifactorial. Recognition and correction of any of the following systemic discrepancies could achieve significant improvements in patient outcomes.

DOCTRINE/POLICY

CBA Question #1 - What is the standard of care for pre-hospital care in U.S. Department of Defense Combat Operations?

CBA Question #2 - Are the TCCC Guidelines the U.S. Department of Defense Combat Operation pre-hospital standard of care?

* Represents the use of non-TCCC Guideline systemic antibiotics for combat casualties.
1. Observations:

   a. In 2013, a senior level Unit Surgeon declined to establish the TCCC Guidelines as the standard of care for pre-hospital trauma care within CJOA-A for US Forces. The Unit Surgeon reported that he felt that standards of care and training standards should be determined at the Army Medical Department level. Further, having a USFOR-A FRAGO establish a standard of care would have no effect on stateside practices. It was also related that there was significant concern and hesitation over applying the term “standard of care” to the medic’s scope of practice since it “implies a level of scrutiny will be applied to a bunch of 19 year olds with little training.”

   b. As determined by data analysis from the Joint Trauma System, the most common and prevailing pre-hospital method for treating pain in CJOA-A is the absence of treatment with a pain medication. Unlike Medical Treatment Facilities which have adhered to Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations pain management standards since 2001, there is no specified or enforced pre-hospital pain management standard. This strongly suggests that the absence of a standard of care contributes directly to an absence of care, and subsequently undue suffering, morbidity and mortality.

2. Discussion:

   Since 2001, the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (CoTCCC) has continuously reviewed, updated, and published Tactical Combat Casualty Care Guidelines based upon up-to-date evidence-based best practices for pre-hospital trauma care on the battlefield. The CoTCCC is a hand-selected 40-person organization comprised of trauma surgeons, emergency medicine and critical care providers, and pre-hospital traumatologists with a vast amount of combat experience. Their TCCC Guidelines are considered to be the state of the art by many military and civilian organizations throughout the world. Nevertheless, though doctrinally accepted and with TCCC training requirements across the Services, there remains no DoD or Service policy dictating the standard of care for pre-hospital combat casualty care. In the absence of mandated DoD standards, combatant commanders and medical leaders at all levels may and do establish their own standards, to include ignoring all or some of the TCCC Guidelines.

3. Finding:

   The lack of standardized TCCC capability may represent a causal factor for the increased killed in action, case fatality rate, and preventable deaths seen in conventional forces when compared to special operations forces.

CBA Question #3 - Are the TCCC Guidelines doctrine?

1. Observations:
TCCC Guidelines have not yet been codified within JP 4-02, *Health Service Support* (26 July 2012). The current Joint Theater Patient Movement CBA led by the Joint Staff Surgeon has within its 20 draft recommendations the development of DoD policy and certification process for pre-hospital trauma care.

**2. Discussion:**

The capstone Joint Publication 1 (JP1) Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States defines Joint Doctrine as, “Joint doctrine consists of the fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. It provides the authoritative guidance from which joint operations are planned and executed.” Since TCCC Guidelines are a product of the CoTCCC, a DoD sponsored entity under the USAISR, they have doctrinal validity in principle as well as practice. As such they qualify as “Authoritative but not Directive,” guidance. JP1 indicates that authoritative guidance is closely related to command authority that rests with the Geographic Combatant Commander or higher at the Services, United States Special Operations Command or the Department of Defense.

**3. Findings:**

*Absent a validated joint requirement which is captured doctrinally, the prevailing resource-constrained environment will challenge Services to fully Organize, Train, and Equip to TCCC standards.*

**CBA Question #4** - What policies or regulations are used to conduct pre-hospital quality assurance and quality improvement programs in the DoD as demonstrated in CJOA-A?

**CBA Question #5** - Are the TCCC Guidelines currently enforceable as a pre-hospital standard of care?

**1. Observations:**

a. CENTCOM Regulation 40-1, *Clinical Quality Assurance Programs* (17 Oct 2012) does not mention quality assurance or quality improvement in the pre-hospital combat environment, limiting its application to Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities. Likewise, though not excluding medical care in the pre-hospital battlefield environment, none of the Services’ quality assurance directive guidance instructions specifically address it either.

b. There does not seem to be an official policy or regulatory requirement to conduct pre-hospital quality assurance and quality improvement in the DoD as demonstrated in CJOA-A. The Medical Lessons Learned (MLLs) efforts may provide some high level or general oversight but they lack the capability to provide feedback on a case by case or
provider by provider basis. Nor are the MLLs captured and aggregated across the CJOA-A.

c. As of August 2013 the JTTS does provide a pre-hospital trauma registry service. However, without published standards, the team cannot provide quality assurance in the absence of a benchmark against which to measure standard of performance.

2. Discussion:

As of August 2013, USCENTCOM’s JTTS, with the support of a USFOR-A FRAGO, began collecting TCCC Cards and TCCC After Action Reports (AARs) from CJOA-A casualties. Compliance with this FRAGO requirement has varied from 9% to 23% from August 2013 to December 2013. Compliance was calculated utilizing the USCENTCOM J-1 Casualty Tracker Report. This report was compared with TCCC AARs received by the JTTS. The low compliance rate precludes meaningful trend analysis, cost-effective research, directed procurement practices, and policy changes that could improve trauma care delivery and ultimately reduce morbidity and mortality. The lack of established or defined standards of care and performance makes quality measurement and quality assurance challenging. Data collection, data analysis, and performance improvement is difficult to accomplish without a standard for care.

3. Findings:

There is no evidence that the DoD or CJOA-A has policies or procedures in place to validate or enforce pre-hospital care within an organization. Service-specific doctrine requiring Unit Surgeons to each establish a standard of care, allows for variant, non-standard delivery of battlefield trauma care across the force. Furthermore, even within a single command rotation of Unit Surgeons introduces and magnifies discontinuity of unit trauma care standards.

CBA Question #6 - Is delivery of TCCC standardized across combatant organizations?

CBA Question #7 - Does our current doctrine support the effective implementation of TCCC Guidelines at the tactical and operational levels on the battlefield?

1. Observations:

a. A current Division Surgeon and future RC-Surgeon related that their division medical leadership organized a standing committee of providers to review the TCCC Guidelines. They then decided if implementing the guidelines was appropriate for their organization. The Surgeon further related that they decided to not field and to not authorize tranexamic acid (TXA) within their division due to their assessment of a perceived lack of efficacy and significant logistical requirements. Their decision to stand up a pre-hospital committee actually degraded their TCCC delivery capability IAW the guidelines.
b. The Services use different medical sets, kits, and outfits across the spectrum of pre-hospital care delivery. A USMC Improved First Aid Kit (IFAK) is different than a USA IFAK. Different medical materials are identified and used to treat the same trauma pathophysiology. There are educational and skill based differences across the Services. Army Medics, Navy Corpsman, and Air Force Medical Technicians along with Special Operations personnel who all receive different levels of training, attend different courses, and are determined qualified under different standards.

2. Discussion:

The capability of combatant organizations to deliver pre-hospital care capability within the TCCC Guidelines is unpredictable and fragmented, as demonstrated by finding only one ROLE-1 in full compliance with TCCC guidelines. Frequently the commitment to deliver pre-hospital care within TCCC guidelines was influenced by medical leaders’ concerns of professional comfort based upon limited personal experience often derived from training and practice experiences outside of a combat environment.

While the current doctrine strongly supports any organization of any size adopting TCCC Guidelines and implementing them as the standard of care, there is no requirement. Some leaders have seized this opportunity to improve pre-hospital care within their organizations and implemented the guidelines. Others, however, have failed to fully implement proven life-saving protocols based upon limited experience or professional concern/comfort.

3. Findings:

The requirements to perform and support pre-hospital TCCC could be standardized across Services (universally or at the Combatant Command level) with the specific means to achieve these Train & Equip standards left up to the respective Services.

ORGANIZATION

CBA Question #8: Are our tactical and operational organizations structured to support the delivery of pre-hospital care?

1. Observations:

a. “Orphan” units exist throughout the CJOA-A without organic licensed providers or medics. Within these organizations general health care delivery is often provided through local area support by co-located medical units. For major bases and forward operating bases (FOBs) this is a reasonable and functional method. However, many of the orphan units also conduct operations outside of the bases. This means medics must
be borrowed from other organizations with some units not having medics on combat operations and subsequent degraded pre-hospital care for these units.

b. During 2013, a US Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) proof of principle was conducted with a USAF Tactical Critical Care Evacuation Team (TCCET) modeled after the demonstrably successful UK MERT in RC-South/Bastion. In theater training for the TCCET included pre-deployment and ride-along training with the UK MERT. Though staffed with adequate medical personnel and capability, the US MERT was not successfully integrated into combat operations due to location and unit of assignment.

2. Discussion:

Units with a maneuver mission placing them at risk of direct contact with enemy forces need sufficient organic medical assets to provide rapid TCCC pre-hospital care at the point of injury. Adequate medical oversight with sufficient expertise and training must also be provided, either organic to the unit or by other arrangement, to ensure training is compliant with TCCC guidelines and to identify and correct skill deficiencies.

The MERT concept is dependent upon a supporting airframe with sufficient vertical lift capacity (i.e. CH-47, CH-53, V-22) to move both the medical team and their equipment to the point of injury. Currently, there are no US MEDEVAC units with organic heavy vertical lift capability. All heavy vertical lift aircraft are assigned and operated by non-medical aviation units. Thus there are only Designated but not Dedicated airframes to support this capability. Currently there is no extant Joint Capability Requirement to deliver such advanced resuscitative care forward to the point of injury. There is increasing evidence that the provision of such early, advanced resuscitative care has positive effects upon both morbidity and mortality from battlefield trauma.

3. Findings:

As with elements of pre-hospital care, organization structures are highly variant with a number of at-risk forces not having adequately manned/trained/equipped medical support.

Units with a tactical evacuation mission requirement should be task organized to be able to provide advanced enroute resuscitative care from the point of injury.

TRAINING

CBA Question #9: Does the current training structure support the effective delivery of pre-hospital care using a standard of care that is tactically and operational available across the spectrum of the battlefield?
1. Observations:

a. Although medically contraindicated, two separate Army medic testing standards require patching (versus shielding) of a traumatized eye. A third testing standard, the U.S. Army’s Expert Field Medical Badge, requires the ability to determine that the eye trauma is limited to the supporting structures versus the globe and then patch the eye.

b. Several doctrinal publications within the Services state that a tourniquet is a choice of last resort and require a stepped approach to controlling life threatening hemorrhage. TCCC guidelines clearly state to “Use a CoTCCC-recommended tourniquet for hemorrhage that is anatomically amenable to tourniquet application.” The jointly written, AMEDDC&S published Emergency War Surgery Fourth United States Revision 2013 states, “Tourniquet May Be the First Choice in Combat” and then also states “Do not avoid use of a tourniquet in order to save a limb and then lose a life!”

c. The recently published 2013 version Emergency War Surgery Fourth United States Revision states, “Tourniquets should not be removed until the hemorrhage can be reliably controlled by advanced hemostatic agents or until arrival at surgery.” However, the TCCC Guidelines state, “Reassess prior tourniquet application. Expose wound and determine if tourniquet is needed. If so, move tourniquet from over uniform and apply directly to skin 2-3 inches above wound. If a tourniquet is not needed, use other techniques to control bleeding.” If educational and doctrinal publications cannot keep pace with TCCC Guidelines then we should simply stick with the guidelines as doctrine and not use indirect methods of communication.

d. Some medical officers have deployed without any TCCC training or the attendance at the Combat Casualty Care Course.

2. Discussion:

DoD published guidance and teaching materials should not be in conflict with one other. Professional peer-reviewed medical journal articles are published frequently in order to inform and guide medical providers on the most current research and best evidence-based practices. It is generally expected that medical providers remain current with the most currently available evidence-based practice standards, and use them in guiding their decision making and care of patients. The TCCC Guidelines are changed in near-real time as new technology and evidence become available, typically every several months (there were 4 changes to the TCCC Guidelines in 2013), in contrast to published texts, which are typically updated every 3-4 years.

3. Findings:
Robust training platforms exist for pre-hospital trauma care, though not all course training syllabi keep apace of current best practices. Sufficient information technologies exist to rapidly and widely disperse new TCCC Guidelines as they become immediately available.

MATERIAL

CBA Question #10: Do our currently fielded tactical medical sets, kits, and outfits ensure the delivery of effective pre-hospital care using TCCC Guidelines?

1. Observations:

   a. Use of the USAAMA approved NSN Eye Injury First Aid found in SKOs throughout the Services is directly contraindicated by TCCC Guidelines and the recommendations of the DoD Vision Center of Excellence. It is also contraindicated by the most basic ubiquitously accepted trauma eye care guidelines. Using this NSN item may actually increase the severity of the eye trauma and decrease the probability of optimal vision recovery. Over $260,000 was spent last year buying and fielding these kits to our combatant forces. This kit has been in the inventory since 1960.

   b. “Shield and Ship” has been a best practice guideline for traumatic eye injuries for over a decade in the US and the DoD. However, data from the JTS indicated we are only 40% compliant with this guideline. Besides issues with training and doctrine, the first level where eye shields are available by logistics doctrine is at the ROLE-1 Battalion Aid Station. There is no requirement (as evidenced by the doctrinal Modified Table of Organization and Equipment) to have eye shields at the point of injury where they are needed urgently to decrease further harm and save eyesight.

   c. The Army SKO for a ROLE-1 is the Medical Equipment Set Tactical Combat Medical Care (TCMC). This set is missing several critical medical materials necessary to provide TCCC Guideline capabilities. Missing items include medication delivery systems, pain control medications, and antibiotics. The set does list antibiotics that could arguably be equivalent to TCCC Guidelines.

2. Discussion:

   Since TCCC Guidelines are not recognized formally as policy, organizations are not resourced with the necessary medical materials to provide TCCC. Nor is there an established mechanism to rapidly incorporate and sustain new materials across the logistics chain when mandated by evolving TCCC Guidelines (e.g. junctional tourniquets), into unit equipment sets. As a result, though TCC materials are available within the system, medics must submit unnecessary justifications to order these materials.

3. Findings:
Unit equipment sets and supporting medical logistics systems have not kept pace with evolving pre-hospital care TCCC guidelines. Out-dated items remain within the supply chain and newly required items have not yet been incorporated into standard configurations.

LEADERSHIP

CBA Question #11: Are tactical, operational, and strategic Command Surgeons correctly empowered under DOTMLPF-P integration to ensure the delivery of effective pre-hospital care using a standard of care?

1. Observations:

   a. “We are not going to use ketamine in this RC. I had a patient who had a dissociative episode in my residency and I’m not going to have that in the field. The only person I have to please is my Division Commander,” Regional Command Surgeon.

2. Discussion:

   Doctrinally, Command Surgeons as functional authorities are empowered through their commanders to establish and enforce health system support policies and standards of care. Inherent within that authority is the need for Command Surgeons to identify and bring forward those policies and standards which require command endorsement, and the willingness of those commanders to act upon the best military medical advice of their Surgeons and commit the resources necessary to support such policies and standards.

   The medical literature shows that potentially survivable fatality rates can be reduced to 3% with the full commitment of unit leadership to train and adhere to TCCC Guidelines. In the absence of mandatory DoD or theater policy to comply with TCCC Guidelines, commitment of both unit Surgeons and commanders remains highly variant across the C-JOA, and there is no mechanism of accountability for suboptimal outcomes when TCCC Guidelines are not followed.

   Regional Command Surgeons have not consistently or effectively established pre-hospital quality assurance systems within CJOA-A subordinate organizations. USCENTCOM’s Pre-Hospital Directorate of the Joint Theater Trauma System is responsible for objective data collection and analysis, and observational reporting.

3. Findings:

   In the absence of a widely mandated policy that establishes TCCC Guidelines as the standard for pre-hospital battlefield care, and accountability for deviations from this standard, the degree of penetrance and acceptance of TCCC Guidelines will remain episodic and dependent upon individual (Surgeon and commander) commitment.
PERSONNEL

CBA Question #13: Are our maneuver commanders and medical leaders adequately trained and educated to ensure the effective delivery of pre-hospital care using TCCC Guidelines across the battlefield?

1. Observations:

a. Commanders\(^7\) – Review of the Infantry and Armor Basic Officer Leaders Courses (BOLC B level) and the USMC Basic School demonstrate that both include first aid training. But, this is at the personal and buddy care level. It does not provide organizational delivery, responsibility, and ownership of the pre-hospital care delivery system. Additionally, the curriculum doesn’t incorporate the tactical/operational executive level training of medical evacuation doctrine or emphasize how “time to a required capability” prevents fatalities and improves the case fatality rate. It is also worth recognizing that the Army’s Command and General Staff Officers’ Course has no medical operational subjects in the published curriculum. This is true of non-medical enlisted leadership courses as well.

b. Medical Leaders\(^8\)

1) The AMEDD BOLC (HPSP) is 25 days long while Infantry BOLC is 17 weeks. The Navy’s Officer Indocritnation School is 6 weeks in Newport News. The Navy Basic Medical Department Officer Course follows it, which is 12 hours of online training. The Navy’s 2 week Advanced Medical Department Officer Course is designed to improve the hospital administration, competencies, and BUMED management skills. The curriculum does not include operational medicine.

2) Many medical officers in the DoD do attend the Combat Casualty Care Course (C4) which focuses on battlefield (including pre-hospital) trauma care. However, TCCC Guidelines have been inconsistently and incompletely incorporated into the C4 training curriculum. Navy Medical Corps officers generally do attend the C4. Army Physician Assistants and Air Force Medical Corps officers may attend, but are not required to do so.

3) Medical Corps of the Army may attend the AMEDD Captain Career Course. However, the target officer is a Lieutenant Colonel as the course is required for

\(^7\) Commander is used here generically. It is intended to represent all levels of non-medical leaders among the combatant units.

\(^8\) Only US Army and US Navy Medical Corps Officer Professional Military Education are discussed. US Air Force Medical Corps Officers are not ubiquitously assigned or participate in conventional ground combat missions in pre-hospital and ROLE-1 care settings.
promotion to Colonel. Additionally, there is a systematic problem with a lack of Medical Corps officer seats in the class. The Navy has no formal professional military educational track for career progression after initial entry training.

4) Junior officer physicians and physician assistants are most often assigned as the senior staff medical members to tactical units (battalion or brigade surgeon) without any prior staff training or experience as a staff officer.

2. Discussion:

   a. Commanders - The required importance of organizational standards and competencies in pre-hospital care are not formally taught to our Warfighters. Subsequently, line commanders must rely on the expertise, leadership and advocacy skills of their assigned medical personnel. If non-medical leaders don’t make battlefield trauma care a priority for their units, then it won’t be a priority for their units. Only by demonstrating the value of evidence-based process improvements will we achieve the necessary support from line leadership as ultimately, they are responsible for enforcing the standard of care and requiring the standard of performance from their operational medics.

   b. Medical Leaders – Most medical curricula are forced to train to time vs train to standard. None effectively focus on or develop pre-hospital care or oversight as specified competencies, particularly as it pertains to the systematic delivery of pre-hospital care. Some course offerings fail to target the appropriate audience of attendees to best ensure proficiency for those most likely to be assigned to operational medicine roles, nor are there structured career pathways to develop and sustain expertise in the realm of pre-hospital care and systemic oversight. A combined Aerospace Medicine and Emergency Medicine program could be one method to provide this skillset. Furthermore, the assignments process often fails to match those with the most relevant training and experience to these critical operational, pre-hospital roles.

3. Findings:

   Neither line nor operational medical leaders are optimally prepared to recognize the importance of a robust, pre-hospital care system, or equipped with the requisite knowledge, skills, or experience to build or sustain such a system within their unit.

FACILITIES

1. Observations: None

2. Discussion: None
3. Findings: None

SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

New Recommendations

1. DoD establishes TCCC Guidelines as the DoD standard of care for pre-hospital care.

2. DoD conducts a DOTMLPF-P assessment across Services to assess and implement TCCC Guideline capability.

3. DoD systematically review and correct all pre-hospital care doctrine across the spectrum to accurately represent TCCC Guidelines with the doctrine specifically stating “in accordance with the current TCCC Guidelines published by the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care” to ensure that the doctrine remains current.

4. Services immediately implement an aggressive transition initiative to update all relevant medical equipment sets and medical logistic policies to ensure units have TCCC Guideline specified medical materials.

5. DoD establish a Battlefield Pre-Hospital Trauma Care Program Proponent (or equivalent structure) in the DHA.

6. DoD develop and mandate a TCCC Accreditation, Certification, and Recertification program like Basic Life Support, Advanced Trauma Life Support, and Advanced Cardiac Life Support for all military personnel with a requirement for biannual re-certification and as based on level of ability and position (e.g. Non-Medical First Responder, Non-Medical Leader, Medical Provider, Medical Leader).

7. Services require and track TCCC certification for all pre-hospital medical personnel and integrate tracking into combatant Unit Status Reports.

8. Services incorporate TCCC Champion training into all basic and advanced officer and non-commissioned officer professional military development courses.

9. Services incorporate and mandate casualty management and hands on practical exercises into all professional military development courses.

10. DoD updates the Joint Capability Requirement for Tactical Enroute Care to include the ability to provide advanced resuscitative care from the point of injury.

11. As military physicians are ultimately responsible for assuming the role of EMS Director for pre-hospital services if assigned to a combatant unit, the military Services should study and
develop career, educational and assignment tracks for operational medical corps officers which includes emphasis upon pre-hospital care delivery.

**Renewed Recommendations**

1. DoD issues an instruction that command-directs an on-going review and analysis of preventable deaths in CJOA-A as they relate to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), tactical trends, personal protective equipment (PPE), evolving injury patterns, and OPTEMPO through a consolidated registry of findings from formal tactical investigations and theater-wide tactical operations interfaced with the DoD Trauma Registry.

2. Services and the Services’ medical departments emphasize to line commanders that the priority and understanding of their tactical casualty response system is critical to preventing combat deaths. (e.g. 75th Ranger Regiment Casualty Response model).

3. Services and the Services’ medical departments train all combatant unit personnel in basic TCCC initially, annually, and within 6 months of combat deployment (e.g. USSOCOM Directive 350-29 model). This should be a requirement for deploying to a combat theater.

4. Services and the Services’ medical departments train all medical personnel (physicians, physician assistants, nurses, medics) in instructor-level TCCC courses initially and within 6 months of combat deployment. This should be a requirement for deploying to a combat theater.

5. Services integrate TCCC-based casualty response into battle drills, small unit tactics, and training exercises at all levels (e.g. 75th Ranger Regiment Casualty Response model).

6. Services and the Services’ medical departments support enduring sustainment hands-on trauma training for all pre-hospital medical personnel (Live Tissue & Trauma Center Rotations) (e.g. USASOC Regulation 350-1 model).

7. Services and the Services’ medical departments emphasize contingency planning in both line and medical leader education to ensure evacuation capabilities in non-permissive environments.

8. Services, Services’ medical departments, and deployed medical personnel minimize use of platelet-inhibiting drugs (e.g. aspirin, Motrin, other COX-1 NSAIDs, SSRIs) in individuals who leave secure areas for combat missions in CJOA-A.

**APPENDIX 1: REFERENCES**


Butler FK, Blackbourne LH: Battlefield Trauma Care Then and Now: A Decade of Tactical Combat Casualty Care. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 2012;73:S395-S402


Orman JA, Eastridge BJ, Baer DG, Gerhardt RT, Rasmussen TE and Blackbourne LH. The impact of 10 years of war on combat casualty care research: A citation analysis. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 2012;73(6):S403-S

APPENDIX 2: SELECT COMMENTS FROM THE THEATER
1. Despite the existence of an USFOR-A FRAGO, implementation of TCCC-After Action Reports submission languished at 9% for US Forces casualties for over five months. Of note, the 9% was primarily USASOC and JSOC submission of pre-hospital documentation. Conventional forces were generally non-compliant. Compliance did not improve until the JTTS began tracking US casualties through the Defense Casualty Information Processing System USCENTCOM J-1 Casualty Tracker and back-briefing non-compliance to USFOR-A/IJC. When the JTTS directly contacted ROLE-1 leadership it was commonly reported that they were unaware of the requirement. This suggests a lack of effective leadership and enforcement of policy to ensure medical systems comply with lawful orders. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Director)

2. From August 2013 to January 2014, JTTS personnel directly engaged in the acquisition and distribution of junctional tourniquets (and other medical supplies) to ensure their availability to USFOR-A Warfighters conducting combat operations. The JTTS is not organized to conduct this mission but we recognized that the engaged forces did not have the requisite effort and support system to obtain these junctional tourniquets in a timely fashion on their own. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Director)

3. The JTTS also conducted battlefield circulation and provided education and training on junctional tourniquets and TCCC Guidelines after recognizing the gravity of the situation. This is another unofficial duty and self-imposed mission of the JTTS that is the responsibility of deployed combatant organizations and their medical leadership. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Director)

4. Recognizing the rarity of fully implemented TCCC Guideline Capability and pre-hospital care advocacy, the JTTS developed the “Ditch Medicine Award” for excellence in pre-hospital care delivery. (See http://www.dvidshub.net/news/120069/3-7-battalion-surgeon-awarded-lifesaving-medical-care#.UvZw1kJdWkQ) (JTTS Pre-Hospital Director)

5. Joint Theater Trauma System recommendations and pre-hospital medical information is being filtered, diluted, changed, or inaccurately conveyed to the end users by intermediate medical leadership. The information feels diluted or changed by higher echelon (Example: Do not order TXA when a ROLE-1 is collocated with an FST). (Army Medical Platoon Leader at ROLE-1)

6. Units can’t order TCCC Cards through the medical system and it is left up to them to figure out how to get them. It needs to be a Class VIII item. It is the duty of the medical logistics system to obtain medical items and to standardize the ordering and procurement process for units. The TCCC Card should be a requirement on the IFAK component list, the CLS bag component list, and the WALK component list. (Army ROLE-1)

7. Regional Command Medical Logistic units required a Letter of Justification staffed through command for critical life saving devices like the junctional tourniquet. (RC MEDLOG BN) (Through a Junctional Tourniquet IJC FRAGO this issue was only temporarily resolved for three months.) (JTTS Pre-Hospital Coordinator)
8. Letter[s] of Justification for medical supplies should not be required by MEDLOG for supplies that you are required maintain. Example: everyone is required to carry a CAT tourniquet but you need a LOJ if you are ordering more than one CAT tourniquet. (Army ROLE-1)

9. Medics should carry black sharpies and fill out the patient cards. We have forgotten on a few occasions to fill them out and it leaves the evacuation team starting from scratch and having difficulties when considering medications potentially previously given but not confirmed through documentation. (Army ROLE-1)

10. In reference to MEDEVAC mission evacuation priority - Never down grade patients, i.e. from urgent to routine, it is my one rule of thumb. We are not on the ground to lay eyes on the situation, if it turns out to be an unnecessary Urgent triage then trouble shoot it after the event during your AAR. (Army MEDEVAC Detachment)

11. We need small compact phantom litters or equivalent for patrols. Phantoms litters are available and they are able to fit on a battle belt or chest rig with ease, they weigh 1 pound and fold down to 1X1 FT. (Army ROLE-1)

12. We need to standardize the training for enlisted medical personnel and physicians across the DoD. This must include standardization of medical equipment in the IFAK, Aid-Bags, and vehicular kits. The injury doesn’t change when you are wearing MARPAT. (USMC ROLE-1)

13. I noted an absence of IV fluid warmers. Two pocket hand warmers can keep a 500ml bag of fluid at approximately 80-850 F for almost 8 hours and the warming process should start 1 hour prior to patrol. (Army ROLE-1)

14. TCCC After Action Reports: After actions should be done as soon as possible after a point of injury patient. (Army ROLE-1)

15. Add to the IFAK the 14 gauge catheter, Fox Eyeshield, TCCC Card, Bolin Chest Seal, and NPA. To the Medical Chest Sets add the 100ml NaCL bag for TXA administration IAW with the TCCC Guidelines. (USMC ROLE-1)

16. Navy- We need TXA, 3% NaCl, mannitol and blood product delivery system to be added to our Medical Chest Sets. (USMC ROLE-1)

17. We need 2 hand pumps for the SAM Junctional Tourniquet, and hand pumps should be fixed to the pneumatic disk, not removable. (CJSOTF ROLE-1)

18. A Battalion’s CLS standard needs to be 100% of Soldiers trained. (Army ROLE-1)
19. A Commander would not authorize unit medics assigned to support a platoon on a nearby Combat Out Post to carry IM Morphine. His reasoning was they are close enough to the Unit FOB for evacuation and it is not needed. (Army ROLE-1)

20. Battalion Surgeon (Professional Filler System Physician) would not give Ketamine to his medics. He requested to see the data despite TCCC Guidelines, the medics “work under his license” and he had custody issues. (Army ROLE-1)

21. Battalion Surgeon would not allow medics to carry, hang or mix IV medications including TXA and TCCC recommended antibiotics because he once saw a nurse mix up a pitocin infusion incorrectly. (USMC ROLE-1)

22. Battalion Surgeon stopped trying to order replacement medical supplies including chronic oral medications and trauma supplies because the Regiment’s medical supply told them they were retrograding and no more Class VIII supply orders would be honored. [Note-Unit was 4 months out from end of mission] (USMC ROLE-1).

23. The TXA vial label states temperature storage should be between 59-890 F, which makes the medication un-useable during the hot months in Afghanistan. (Army ROLE-1)

24. There are no 100ml NaCl bags in the Medical Chest Sets to administer TXA per TCCC Guidelines. (Army ROLE-1)

25. Need to add medical supplies into the Medical Chest Sets to support a Walking Blood Bank (Fresh Whole Blood) plan for units that deploy to austere environments such as in the beginning of the war. Add Walking Blood Bank to the TCCC Guidelines (Army ROLE-1)

26. No physiologic monitoring devices like the Propaq or Tempus are in the Medical Equipment Trauma for the Battalion Aid Station (Army ROLE-1).

27. There are several Chest Seals that can be ordered, however, the Army needs to identify the two best vented chest seals for ordering, and they need to be listed in the TCCC Guidelines. (Army ROLE-1)

28. Medics who come straight from AIT have been trained not to give fluids to a TBI casualty. Fluids must be administered to gain a peripheral pulse in a pulseless casualty per TCCC Guidelines. (Army ROLE-1)

29. Units must have DODDAC issues corrected prior to deployment. Unit went 90 days without the ability to order supplies due to Unit DODDAC issues. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Coordinator)

30. How do we get the TCCC AAR to the JTTS when the internet (Outlook) is not available? Hand written documentation has proven to be ineffective as it gets lost, damaged or unreadable. (Army ROLE-1)
31. Our ROLE I PROFIS physician is a Hematologist who has never been assigned to a line unit? Is this really the best provider for the Infantry? (Army ROLE-1)

32. 68Ws should be issued an Aid Bag with their initial issue from CIF, and they should be able to DX [direct exchange] it for the next updated Aid Bag the Army adopts. (Army ROLE-1)

33. Medics need to carry and train on valium when carrying Ketamine. The Ketamine should come in a smaller vial [one TCCC dose-volume] and should have the pop-seal device like the ketorolac vial has. (Army ROLE-1)

34. Medics authorized and carrying IV/IM ketorolac in trauma but not TCCC Guideline analgesia.

35. Add IV saline lock and IV Hextend back to CLS training since now that the only lifesaving fluid needed to be carried is Hextend 500ml. This prevents hypotensive resuscitation problems by blowing clots with fluid overload. The medic relies on CLS with multiple casualties to initiate IVs to also give meds like antibiotics and ketamine. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Coordinator)

36. After our briefing of the TCCC Guidelines and the recent FRAGOs, unit medics were not aware of the standards. They felt that the information they received was being diluted through the chain of information flow, or that the information was being changed, or they were not getting the information at all. (Army ROLE-1)

37. IPAP (Interservice Physician Assistant Program) used to be “from the line to the line”. Medics that grew up in the line units become the best PAs because they lived it and understood how a combat unit operates and what medics need to know. The IPAP now receives non-medic officers and enlisted personnel and put them and the Unit at a disadvantage. A Dental Tech became a PA and deployed straight out of IPAP and is the sole provider in an isolated FOB. He admits his inadequacies for combat. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Coordinator)

38. A FOB in the retrograde process had no heat for the medic living area or the BAS for 3-4 weeks. The BAS got to 280 F, a bad scenario for potential trauma casualties. The Leadership acknowledged the deficiency but did nothing about it. (USMC ROLE-1)

39. TCCC instruction sites need to have the latest TCCC Guidelines (Army ROLE-1)

40. Unit ordered the FAST-1 IO and was told they will most likely not be receiving any. They also are not able to get Hextend. Each of the Corpsman going out on patrol has one bag but there are none in the BAS and therefore no resupply if the Hextend has to be used. They were told that as far as supplies goes they will only receive what they have on hand at Leatherneck because they are no longer allowed to order supplies due to Leatherneck closing down "soon." (USMC ROLE-1). [JTTS Note – the authors observed hundreds of new in box TCCC medical supplies including FAST-1s and Hextend being burned at the Bagram retrograde yard).
41. Marines - Independent Corpsman in an advisory mission ROLE to other militaries during deployment do not get medical supplies to support their mission because they are not in an organic marine unit. Only organic units get supplies as designed for that unit. Command did not buy medical equipment with OCO funds because they were too expensive. (USMC ROLE-1 minus)

42. Many units in Afghanistan deployed and found themselves subordinate to different Commands of other units. This makes the chain of supply system difficult to use, and the Command Unit SOP in regard to utilization of the medics interferes with the medical element to fulfill their mission (i.e., providing medics for guard duty). (Army ROLE-1)

43. MC4 computers automatically uploads notes into TMDS. The system does not notify you if the notes do not upload. I know where to look so I was able to correct the problem but if someone does not know where to look the notes would eventually be lost when the computer gets wiped before going home. (Army ROLE-1)

44. We need to focus medical training on the worst case scenario which was during the beginning of the war. Train and equip medics to operate when the evacuation times were greater than 2 hours. Medical needs to be in every Commander’s top 4 priorities. Those Commanders that have had casualties or had soldiers die understand this, but as new Commanders rotate in without that experience, the reality will diminish. (Army Infantry Battalion Commander)

45. Non-medical Platoon Sergeants need to know the ROLE of the medic in his platoon, and should understand the TCCC Guidelines. This should be accomplished at the Senior Leaders Course. In CONUS, medics should rotate through trauma centers for realistic training to understand combat casualties. (Army 1SG)

46. I was at C4 (Combat Casualty Care Course) and Brigade Combat Team medical training earlier this week to see what the tourniquet training is like, and the regular tourniquets seem well integrated and mature. The junctional tourniquets are taught lightly and are not fully integrated nor as maturely used as regular tourniquets. Mostly there is an awareness gap, and the funding and lack of doctrinal enactment are the main sources of the awareness gap. I suspect that other teaching venues may vary as the onus seems to be on the key leaders. The services are being led by the small unit leaders.-JFK. Kragh, John Frederick Jr, CIV MEDCOM, USAISR

47. Using Afghanistan as an example, we must train as we fight for the most common worst case scenarios, which is always in the beginning of the war. Units are more austere located and isolated, and medical support is very limited. Evacuation times are lengthy and medics will need to hold onto casualties longer. All 68Ws, Corpsman and AF Medical Technicians entering the Military need to be trained on all TCCC Guidelines interventions if we are serious about providing the best chance for combat casualties to survive at the point of injury. CONUS Medic
training programs must mirror what medics do in combat, and must implement all the TCCC Guidelines as the standard of care in combat. Completion of the TCCC AAR and the Evacuation Patient Care Report (PCR) for combat casualties must be a part of the weekly Commander’s brief for his unit, just as DNBI trends and dead-lined vehicles are. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Coordinator)

48. TCCC Guidelines should supersede a physician’s opinion when it comes to developing, implementing and ensuring an organization’s TCCC capability. A physician’s medical license is not threatened with the implementation of the TCCC Guidelines on the battlefield. All licensed providers at all levels need to be educated on this issue during their career and reminded of this point just prior to deployment. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Coordinator)

49. The TCCC curriculum does make a point of individual providers treating individual patients as needed by the tactical situation. However, this doesn’t mean that a provider should systematically and programmatically undermine a unit’s life saving capabilities that are provided by the full implementation of the TCCC Guidelines. Especially when their decisions compromise the command’s pre-hospital capabilities due to ignorance and subsequent inappropriate professional concerns. (JTTS Pre-Hospital Director)

50. Unit medical training must be integrated into the unit mission training, just as performed by units during NTC and JRTC rotations. This is realistic unit combat medical training. (Army ROLE-1)